Underwood Distinguished Professor & Professor of Philosophy
Profile
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen is Underwood Distinguished Professor and Professor of Philosophy at Underwood International College, Yonsei University. He has worked at UIC since the fall semester of 2011. His main research areas are epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and the philosophies of logic, mathematics, and technology. He is the founder of the Veritas Research Center (Yonsei University) and a co-founder of the Asian Epistemology Network and Eastern Hemisphere Language and Metaphysics Network. He has led several major collaborative research projects and co-edited numerous collections, including Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford University Press, 2020), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), and Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (Oxford University Press, 2013). He is the founding editor in chief of the Asian Journal of Philosophy (Springer Nature) and serves on the editorial board of Argumenta (journal of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy), Philosophical Analysis (철학적 분석; journal of the Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy), and the Korean Journal of Logic (한국논리연구; journal of the Korean Association for Logic).
Education
Courses and Current Research Areas
Courses at UIC:
In the past, I have taught graduate level and upper- and lower-division undergraduate courses at UCLA, University of Aberdeen, and University of Copenhagen. I have likewise supervised theses and independent studies at both the graduate and undergraduate level. My teaching and supervision cover topics in epistemology, social epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, formal logic, philosophical logic, philosophy of science, and ethics.
Selected Publications
Monograph:
M1. 202x. Foundations without Evidence: Scepticism, Mathematics and Entitlement. Under contract with Springer. (Co-author: M. Zicchetti.)
Edited books:
E7. (2021). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Under contract with Brill. (Co-editor: L. Moretti) (Brill, amazon.)
E6. (2020). Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-editor: P. Graham) (OUP, amazon.)
E5. (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. (Co-editors: M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson) (Routledge, amazon.)
E4. (2018). Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editors: N. Kellen and J. Wyatt) (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)
E3. (2017). Epistemic Pluralism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: A. Coliva) (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)
E2. (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.(Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (OUP USA, OUP UK.)
E1. (2010). New Waves in Truth. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (Palgrave Macmillan, amazon.)
Journal articles, volume chapters, encyclopedia entries:
39. (2021). Extended knowledge overextended? In K. Lai (ed.): Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy (191–233), Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring)
38. (2021). Cornerstone epistemology: scepticism, mathematics, non-evidentialism, consequentialism, pluralism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (230–264). Brill.
37. 2021). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (1–24). Brill. (Co-author: Luca Moretti.)
36. (2021). Austere truth pluralism. In M. P. Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, J. Kim & N. Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth: Classical and Contemporary Readings (629–656), 2ndedition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Co-authors: F. Ferrari and S. Moruzzi)
35. (2020). Dretske & McDowell on Percpetual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues, 30: 148–166. (Co-author: P. Graham)
34. (2020). Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(4): 355–375. (Preprint)
33. (2020). On moderate pluralism about truth and logic. Philosophical Forum 51(2): 143–160.
32. (2020). Recent work on epistemic entitlement. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2): 193–214. (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)
31. (2020). On the normative variability of truth and logic. Inquiry, 63(3-4): 236–257. (Preprint – Journal link)
30. (2020). Pluralist consequentialist anti-scepticism. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (297–326). Oxford University Press. (Preprint)
29. (2020). Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (1–34) Oxford University Press. (Co-authors: Peter Graham, Zachory. Bachman, and Luis Rosa.) (Preprint)
28. (2019). Epistemic peer disagreement. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (174–184). (Co-author: Filippo Ferrari). (Preprint)
27. (2019). Introduction. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (xvi–xxii). (Co-authors: Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson.)
26. (2018). Strong truth pluralism. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (107–130). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-author: Seahwa Kim.) (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)
25. (2018). Introduction. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (3–34). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-authors: J. Wyatt and N. Kellen.) (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)
24. (2018). Truth Pluralism. In M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth (543-575). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: M. P. Lynch) (Preprint)
23. (2018). Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. Synthese, 195: 2935-2966. (Preprint – Journal link)
22. (2017). Pure epistemic pluralism. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (47-92). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)
21. (2017). Introduction. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (1-19). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: A. Coliva) (Preprint – Google Books)
20. (2016). Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme. In P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics (185-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint - Oxford Scholarship Online)
19. (2014). All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge? Philosophical Issues, 24: 24-38. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Preprint – Published version)
18. (2014). On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Synthese, 191: 2445-2470. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring and J. U. Hansen) (Preprint – Published version)
17. (2014). Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 79: 259--277. (A special issue on logical monism, pluralism, and relativism edited by D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin, and M. Rossberg.) (Preprint – Published version)
16. (2013). The epistemology of absence-based inference. Synthese, 190: 2573-2593. (Co-author: J. Kallestrup) (Preprint – Published version)
15. (2013). The epistemology of inclusiveness. Synthese, 190: 1185-1188. (Co-authors: K. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Kappel) (Published version)
14. (2013). Introduction. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (10-38). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint – Google Books)
13. (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (87-112). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint – Google Books)
12. (2012). Recent work on alethic pluralism. Analysis, 72: 588-607. (Preprint – Journal link)
11. (2012). Pluralist theories of truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright)
10. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 125-133. (Symposium on Lynch's Truth as One and Many). (Preprint – Journal link)
9. (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: on Lynch's alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213-230. (Co-author: D. Edwards) (Preprint – Journal link)
8. (2010). Second-order knowledge. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (586-596). London: Routledge. (Co-author: C. Kelp) (Preprint – Routledge)
7. (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (205-217). London: Palgrave Macmillan). (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)
6. ((2010). Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment. In Noûs, 44: 329-339. (Co-author: M. Rossberg) (Preprint – Journal link)
5. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92-108. (Preprint – Journal link)
4. (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem without categorical sortals. Erkenntnis, 71: 141-155. (Preprint – Journal link)
3. (2009). Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese, 171: 443-457. (Preprint – Journal link)
2. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89: 103-117. (Preprint – Journal link)
1. (2006). Entitlements, good and bad. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 7: 58-82. (Preprint – Journal link)
More Information
For more information please visit my home-page.
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