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Faculty Profiles

Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

Professor of Philosophy

  • Social Epistemology Network, steering committee member.

  • Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR), steering committee member.
  • Argumenta, editorial board.
  • Philosophical Analysis, editorial board.
  • Senior Research Fellow, Social Epistemology Research Group, University of Copenhagen, 2009-2011.
  • Carlsberg Foundation Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, UCLA, 2006-2009.
  • Ph.D., Arché Research Centre, University of St. Andrews, 2006.

Email: nikolajpedersen@gmail.com
Tel: 032-749-3010
Office: Veritas Hall B427

Profile

I’m Professor of Philosophy at Underwood International College. I have worked at UIC since the fall of 2011. My main research areas are epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic. Much of my recent and current work focuses on pluralism about truth, logic, or ontology (sometimes in combination). I also like to think about non-evidential warrant, epistemic value, and epistemic consequentialism. Additionally, I have done some work on the epistemology of absence-based inference, open-ended schemas, and neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics.

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Arché, University of St. Andrews, 2006
Cand. Mag. in Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, 2002
M.Litt. in Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, 2001
BA in Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, 2001

Courses and Current Research Areas

Courses at UIC:

  • UIC3637: Being and Truth (UIC Seminar).
  • UIC3574: Formal Methods (UIC Seminar).
  • UIC2101: Critical Reasoning.
  • UIC1901: World Philosophy (Knowledge, Virtual Reality and the Internet).
  • UIC1901: World Philosophy (Epistemology).
  • UIC1901: World Philosophy (A Philosophical Introduction to Decision Theory).
  • UCS1001: Freshman Seminar.

In the past, I have taught graduate level and upper- and lower-division undergraduate courses at UCLA, University of Aberdeen, and University of Copenhagen. I have likewise supervised theses and independent studies at both the graduate and undergraduate level. My teaching and supervision cover topics in epistemology, social epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, formal logic, philosophical logic, philosophy of science, and ethics.

Selected Publications

Edited books:

G. (202x). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Under contract with Brill. (Co-editor: L. Moretti)

F. (2020). Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-editor: P. Graham) (OUPamazon.)

E. (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. (Co-editors: M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson) (Routledgeamazon.)

D. (2018). Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editors: N. Kellen and J. Wyatt) (Palgrave Macmillanamazon.)

C. (2017). Epistemic Pluralism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: A. Coliva) (Palgrave Macmillanamazon.)

B. (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.(Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (OUP USAOUP UK.)

A. (2010). New Waves in Truth. London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-editor: Cory D. Wright) (Palgrave Macmillanamazon.)

Journal articles, volume chapters, encyclopedia entries:

40. (202x). The paradox of conceptualizability. To appear in Philosophia. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00227-0  

39. (2021). Extended knowledge overextended? To appear in Extending knowledge: reflections on epistemic agency and epistemic environment in East-West philosophy, edited by K. Lai, Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring)

38. (2021). Cornerstone epistemology: scepticism, mathematics, non-evidentialism, consequentialism, pluralism. To appear in N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill.

37. (2021). Introduction. To appear in N. J. L. L. Pedersen & L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. (Co-author: Luca Moretti.)

36. (2020). Austere truth pluralism. To appear in M. P. Lynch, J. Wyatt, J. Kim, and N. Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Co-authors: F. Ferrari and S. Moruzzi) (Preprint)

35. (2020). Dretske & McDowell on Percpetual Knowledge, Conclusive Reasons, and Epistemological Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues, 30: 148–166. (Co-author: P. Graham)

34. (2020). Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(4): 355–375. (Preprint)

33. (2020). On moderate pluralism about truth and logic. Philosophical Forum 51(2): 143–160.

32. (2020). Recent work on epistemic entitlement. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2): 193–214. (Co-author: P. Graham) (Preprint)

31. (2020). On the normative variability of truth and logic. Inquiry, 63(3-4): 236–257. (Preprint – Journal link)

30. (2020). Pluralist consequentialist anti-scepticism. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (297–326). Oxford University Press. (Preprint)

29. (2020). Introduction and Overview: Two Entitlement Projects. In P. Graham & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): Epistemic Entitlement (1–34) Oxford University Press. (Co-authors: Peter Graham, Zachory. Bachman, and Luis Rosa.) (Preprint)

28. (2019). Epistemic peer disagreement. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (174–184). (Co-author: Filippo Ferrari). (Preprint)

27. (2019). Introduction. In M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (xvi–xxii). (Co-authors: Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson.)

26. (2018). Strong truth pluralism. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (107–130). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-author: Seahwa Kim.) (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)

25. (2018). Introduction. In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, and N. Kellen (eds.): Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (3–34). Palgrave McMillan. (Co-authors: J. Wyatt and N. Kellen.) (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)

24. (2018). Truth Pluralism. In M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth (543-575). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: M. P. Lynch) (Preprint)

23. (2018). Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. Synthese, 195: 2935-2966. (Preprint – Journal link)

22. (2017). Pure epistemic pluralism. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (47-92). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)

21. (2017). Introduction. In A. Coliva and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (1-19). London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Co-author: A. Coliva) (Preprint – Google Books)

20. (2016). Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme. In P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics (185-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Preprint - Oxford Scholarship Online)

19. (2014). All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge? Philosophical Issues, 24: 24-38. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring) (Preprint – Published version)

18. (2014). On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Synthese, 191: 2445-2470. (Co-author: J. C. Bjerring and J. U. Hansen) (Preprint – Published version)

17. (2014). Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 79: 259--277. (A special issue on logical monism, pluralism, and relativism edited by D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin, and M. Rossberg.) (Preprint – Published version)

16. (2013). The epistemology of absence-based inference. Synthese, 190: 2573-2593. (Co-author: J. Kallestrup) (Preprint – Published version)

15. (2013). The epistemology of inclusiveness. Synthese, 190: 1185-1188. (Co-authors: K. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Kappel) (Published version)

14. (2013). Introduction. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (10-38). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint – Google Books)

13. (2013). Pluralism about truth as alethic disjunctivism. In N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C. D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates (87-112). New York: Oxford University Press. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint – Google Books)

12. (2012). Recent work on alethic pluralism. Analysis, 72: 588-607. (Preprint – Journal link)

11. (2012). Pluralist theories of truthStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Co-author: Cory D. Wright)

10. (2012). True alethic functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 125-133. (Symposium on Lynch's Truth as One and Many). (Preprint – Journal link)

9. (2011). Truth as One(s) and Many: on Lynch's alethic functionalism. Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213-230. (Co-author: D. Edwards) (Preprint – Journal link)

8. (2010). Second-order knowledge. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (586-596). London: Routledge. (Co-author: C. Kelp) (Preprint – Routledge)

7. (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (205-217). London: Palgrave Macmillan). (Co-author: Cory D. Wright) (Preprint – Palgrave Macmillan)

6. ((2010). Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment. In Noûs, 44: 329-339. (Co-author: M. Rossberg) (Preprint – Journal link)

5. (2010). Stabilizing alethic pluralism. Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92-108. (Preprint – Journal link)

4. (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem without categorical sortals. Erkenntnis, 71: 141-155. (Preprint – Journal link)

3. (2009). Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese, 171: 443-457. (Preprint – Journal link)

2. (2006). What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism? The Monist, 89: 103-117. (Preprint – Journal link)

1. (2006). Entitlements, good and bad. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 7: 58-82. (Preprint – Journal link)

More Information

For more information please visit my home-page.

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